This study investigates the tax aggressiveness in politically connected companies.
Background of the Study
The term of tax aggressiveness often refers to the tax avoidance (Hanlon & Shane, 2010) and it is part of tax planning. Tax aggressiveness is viewed as a activity of value maximization that shifts the wealth from the state to the company shareholders (Kim, Li, & Zhang, 2011) . Definition of Tax aggressiveness has been provided by many experts.
For example, (Hanlon & Shane, 2010) provide us with definition of tax aggressiveness as behavior of tax planning that being at more aggressiveness end of the description. Managerial decisions were planned merely to keep down corporate taxes through activities of tax aggressiveness (Lanis & Richardson, 2011) . However, corporate tax aggressiveness carry the significant disadvantage and merits for society, management, and stockholders (Lanis & Richardson, 2011) . The primary benefit of tax aggressiveness make company's shares more attractive and positive news to the capital market (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009 ).
The First ELEHIC However, (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009 ) add that the disadvantage of tax aggressiveness are the potential for tax fine and penalties, implementation cost, reputational cost, and political cost. Corporate tax aggressiveness may generate agency problems due to the unaligned interest of managers and stockholders regarding to tax risk (Wahab, Ariff, Marzuki, & Sanusi, 2017) . Further, (Wahab et al., 2017) argue that the stockholders want manager or directors will take actions on benefit of them and one way to do it is by focusing on profit maximatition through reducing the tax liabilities.
There are a bundle of previous studies on corporate tax aggressiveness (Adhikari, rates and political connections in developing economies (Malaysia) and conclude that politically connected companies pay tax at significantly lower effective rates (more tax aggresiveness) compared to other company. Moreever, (Chen et al., 2010) investigate the tax aggressiveness between family and non-family company and found that family companies are less tax aggressiveness compared to non-family companies. Further, (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009 ) carry out a study of stock price reaction to news about corporate tax aggressiveness and conclude that a company's stock price declines when there is news about its involvement in tax shelters. Thereafter, (Kim & Zhang, 2016) investigate the relationship between political connected companies and tax aggressiveness using U.S companies and conclude that the politically connected companies are more tax aggressiveness than no connected companies. Thus, (Lanis & Richardson, 2012a) examine the relationship between corporate social responsibility and corporate tax aggressiveness using 408 Australian listed companies and found that more socially responsible companies are likely to be less tax aggressiveness. In addition, (Richardson et al., 2016) companies. Beside, this study also determines whether politically connected companies more tax aggressiveness. This paper is organized as follow: the first session discusses about background of the study. The second session is about theoretical aspect and followed by methodology in the third session. Fourth session discuss the result and discussion and finally the conclusion and recommendation session in the fifth session.
Tax Aggresiveness and Politically Connected Companies
Tax aggressiveness may be favoured by investors where it transfers value from the government to the firm and it advance shareholder's interests (Desai & Dharmapala 2009 ).
However, this value transfer may be twisted and create the agency problems (Desai & Dharmapala, 2009 suggest that it is neccessary to make stronger the external and internal corporate gover- Based on the system used in Indonesia, it may be expected that politically connected companies of Indonesia tends to be more tax aggresive compared to non connected companies. Therefore, the hypothesis is developed as follow.
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The First ELEHIC
Methodlogy
To test the hypothesis, this study use the manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). the final sample of this study is 125 companies or 625 companiesyears observation. Data were collected from financial reports which gathered through IDX website. Politically connected companies were identified by see the name of company which followed by Persero. 
Result and Discussion
As mention above, this study aims to investigate whether politically connected companies is more tax aggressive compared to non-connected companies. Using 625 company-years observation, the means, standard deviation, minimal and maximal values are demonstrated in Table 1 . Means value of tax aggressiveness is 0.23 which is lower than finding of (Dyreng et al., 2010) . Thus, it implies that Indonesia companies is more tax aggressiveness. Regarding to company's ability to earn the profit (profitability), average value of company profitability is 5.52% with minimal and maximal value are -55% and 260% respectively. In addition, leverage means value is 52.77% which imply that 0.5277 of assets are financed by debt and the rest is funded by equities. Further, the means value of profitability is higher for politically connected companies (6.27%) rather than non-connected companies (5.48%). There is possible explanation for higher profitability of politically connected companies. Politically connected companies tend to have a better information regarding tax regulation and enforcement, lower political cost, and lower capital market pressure for transparency (C. Kim & Zhang, 2016) . All above benefits will create the good profitability position. For example, better information will yield low tax cost and therefore increase the net income and finally result higher return on asset. However, the difference is not significant. Further, leverage is lower for politically connected companies (38.79%) compared to non-connected companies (53.35%). This result may be explained by fact that politically connected companies has a limited capabilities to expand (Wahab, Zain, & Rahman, 2015) . In this context, Indonesia's political connection companies fail to take advantage of taking debt as main sources of fund to finance the company's asset. The study periods (2012-2016) is a period of better economic condition which characterized by low interest rate, including low cost of debt. Well-managed companies would take this opportunity to expand by using the debt capital to finance the expanding activities. However, politically connected companies fail to do so.
Conclusion and Recommendation
Tax aggressiveness among politically connected companies have been attracting an academics and practitioners recently. Politically connected companies are likely to be more tax aggressiveness in US and Malaysia. However, tax aggressiveness of politically connected companies are unknown in Indonesia. In addition, it is expected that politically connected companies in Indonesia tend to more tax aggressiveness as well.
Using manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange, it can be concluded that tax aggressiveness of politically connected companies are more tax aggressiveness compared to non-connected companies. However, the means difference is not significant at 5%. Besides, this study also reveals that profitability is higher for politically connected companies. However, the company leverage is lower for politically connected companies. This study has theoretical and practical implication. Theoretically, this study contributes to political economy discipline in the sense that by design, there is a transfer of wealth from the state to shareholders. Relation-based economy creates the opportunities for politically connected companies to reduce the tax liabilities due to having a better information, and lower political cost of aggressive tax planning. Practically, politically connected companies should not gain the competitive advantage through relation-based economy because this relation-based economy is temporary. A number of important limitations need to be considered. First, this study is descriptive in nature.
Second, this article uses one sector (manufacturing sector). Finally, this paper only uses three variables. Therefore, it is recommended that further research be undertaken in the following areas. First, future researcher can advance this study by testing the effect of politically connected companies on tax aggressiveness. Second, next research can emphasize by adding more sector as research object, such as main sector, or service and trading sector. Finally, next analysis also can be done by adding other variables, such as corporate governance concepts.
